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On the basis of an analysis oí the historical evolution 
of real international interest rates, the author asserts 
that the main factor which increased the external 
debt burden in the 1980s was the excessively and 
unexpectedly high levels reached by such rates. This 
increase, which took both bankers and debtor coun-
tries by surprise, so that they do not appear to bear 
major responsibility for this process, mainly origi-
nated in the economic policy followed by the United 
States Government. Through mechanisms which are 
analysed by the author, this policy increased the debt 
service burden and reduced the volumes and prices of 
commodity exports, giving rise to a transfer of 
resources from the debtor countries which exceeds 
3% of their gross domestic product per year. 
Lightening the debt burden necessarily calls for 
a reform of the international monetary system based 
on the co-ordinated intervention of the developed 
countries in the money markets, together with the 
economic expansion of those countries. The author 
considers that in recent years the macroeconomic 
policy of the central countries has led to a considera-
ble distortion of some relative prices: the debtor 
countries should not commit the serious error of 
designing their economic policies in line with those 
prices (as for example by giving priority to the 
achievement of a big trade surplus), since when some 
degree of normality returns to the international 
macroeconomic scene, they will find that their hard-
won "structural adjustments" have taken them along 
the wrong track. 
•Director of the Central Bank of the Argentine 
Republic. This study was prepared for the Group on Inter-
national Monetary and Financial Issues for the Developing 
Countries (a subsidiary organ of the Group of 24), under 
UNDI'/DNCTAD Joint Project INT/H4/021. The author 
wishes to thank other bodies also for their support. 
The views expressed here arc those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect the views of the UNCTAI) secreta-
riat, UND11, or the Central Bank of the Argentine Republic. 
Introduction 
The debt crisis, which has more than one antece-
dent in the not so distant past, exploded in 1982, 
threatening to bring down the international 
financial system and unleash a more generalized 
slump of the kind seen in the 1930s. Attitudes in 
the countries of the North quickly evolved from 
panic to near complacency only two years later, 
however. The rapid growth of the United States 
economy in 1984, affecting the whole world 
through the spill-over effect of its fast increasing 
trade deficit, seemed to announce the end of the 
debt problem. Yet at the same time the highly 
indebted countries were going through their 
worst crisis since the 1930s depression. Stagna-
tion or reduction in per capita income, falls in 
real wages, and growth of unemployment have 
been widespread. Investment in new productive 
facilities has failed to keep up with the need for 
growth and fiscal accounts have been thrown 
dramatically out of balance as a consequence of 
the burden of foreign debt service on progres-
sively tighter terms. Furthermore, the decelera-
tion of the United States economy, the 
persistence of high real rates of interest, the 
impact of lower levels of economic activity and 
expenditure in industrialized countries, and the 
effect of the high dollar on commodity prices 
have all led to renewed concern about the debt 
crisis in the last twelve months in the creditor 
countries themselves. 
The conventional solution to the debt prob-
lem —that of rescheduling maturities of the 
principal and mobilizing "fresh money" from 
commercial banks and IMF funds to cover inter-
est service— is showing signs of exhaustion. By 
throwing the burden of adjustment almost com-
pletely onto the debtor countries it has entailed 
for too long a period sacrifices that could be only 
accepted if the situation were transitory. Worst 
of all, the conventional way to administer the 
debt problem has achieved very little improve-
ment beyond keeping the banks' profits at a 
fairly high level and ensuring a rapid reduction 
in the exposure ratios of bank capital to develop-
ing country debt. 
The implicit assumption in debt administra-
tion seems also to be fundamentally misplaced. 
The lion's share of the adjustment has had to be 
taken up by the indebted countries themselves. 
Little or nothing has been done to encourage 
better performance in the world economy apart 
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from the United States' fiscally induced boom, 
which generated —because of its unilateralism 
and biased policy-mix— so many distortions as 
to preclude its generalization to the rest of the 
world economy. There has also been great reluc-
tance to provide the necessarily vast amounts of 
finance required in the debt crisis in order to tide 
the indebted countries over the shock induced by 
the persistent deflationary forces at work in the 
world economy since 1979-
In fact, the debt problem, far from being 
mainly attributable to domestic developments in 
the indebted countries, may be much more fruit-
fully understood as part of two different but 
certainly strongly-linked forces at work in the 
world economy. The first force is what the 
World Bank has aptly called the rise and fall of 
commercial bank financing of the developing 
countries' balance of payments. Debt accumula-
tion, at the abnormally high levels of interest 
rates of the last few years, has put an end to the 
de fació international monetary and develop-
ment finance system of the 1970s, based on bank 
At the beginning of the 1970s commercial bank 
lending represented only a small fraction of total 
borrowing by the developing countries. By 1971, 
the share of bank loans in the aggregate debt of 
these countries was slightly above 10%, whereas 
official bilateral and multilateral credits made up 
more than two-thirds of that same aggregate 
(UNCTAD, 1985, p.65). Only 15% of the total net 
resource receipts of developing countries in 1970 
had been provided by commercial banks, but by 
1981 this figure had risen to more than 27% 
(World Bank, 1985, table 2.3, p. 21). Rates of 
growth of such lending were at the level of 40 to 
50% in the first half of the 1970s and almost 
30% in the period 1975-1979. Lending from 
lending. The second force in recent years has 
been the strong commitment to fight inflation 
on the basis of demand restriction in a context of 
unilateral international policy making, which 
was made possible by the acceptance of floating 
exchange rates. The peculiar disinflation thus 
induced, with its high real rates of interest and 
low commodity prices, naturally created difficult 
problems for all debtors, whether in developing 
or in industrialized countries. 
A solution to the debt problem, therefore, 
would require the replacement of commercial 
bank financing for developing countries by some 
new system which would probably entail a much 
larger role for public institutions. The solution 
would also demand policies for economic growth 
entailing close co-ordination among countries to 
overcome today's disequilibria with as little dam-
age as possible to both industrialized and devel-
oping countries. For both these reasons a 
solution to the debt problem is intimately con-
nected with the reform of the international 
monetary system. This paper is devoted to the 
development of this argument. 
official sources, in the meantime, had declined to 
55% of the developing countries' total medium 
and long-term debt by 1979 (UNCTAD, 1985, 
pp. 65-66). 
The reasons for this explosion of commer-
cial bank lending to the developing countries 
have been well explored. On the side of the 
borrowers the main reasons were the need to 
finance balance-of-payments deficits generated 
by the first oil shock and the easy access to a large 
volume of resources. On the lending side, banks 
seized the opportunity to develop a very profita-
ble line of business on the basis of the ample 
funds deposited by the oil-exporting countries. 
I 
Commercial banking vis-à-vis public institutions in the 
provision of finance to the developing countries 
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Some innovations introduced in loan con-
tracts were also instrumental in the expansion of 
the market. Syndication of loans, with the incor-
poration of cross-default clauses, spread the risk 
among a multitude of lenders and placed the 
borrower in a position where the penalties for 
default on any specific loan had been clearly 
increased. Sovereign risk was, in any case, 
thought to be small. Even if it is more difficult to 
enforce loan contracts concluded with countries 
than with private domestic borrowers, the 
accepted wisdom held that countries do not go 
bankrupt. Even quite recently it has been argued 
that sovereign lending is less risky than domestic 
operations. In his well-known work on interna-
tional debt, William Cline offers a calculation 
showing that domestic lending is more than 
two-and-a-half times as risky as country 
lending.l 
The main innovation in bank lending to 
developing countries, however, was the floating 
interest rate loan. This enabled banks to effect 
the transformation of short-term liabilities into 
medium-term assets without assuming any 
interest rate risk. Floating interest rate loans 
now make up more than half of the public debt of 
major borrowers and almost 43% of that of all 
developing countries taken together (World 
Bank, 1985, table 2.4, p. 21). 
With the arrival of the second oil shock, 
motives for balance-of-payments financing, if 
anything, increased for non-oil-exporting devel-
oping countries. With hindsight one can now see 
that the pace of bank lending, however, started 
to decline. While the annual rate of growth of 
the external assets of banks vis-h-vis developing 
countries was above 33% for the 1975-1977 
triennium and almost 24% both for 1978 and 
1979, in 1980 and 1981 —well before the 1982 
crisis— it had declined to20% and 15%, respec-
tively (UNCTAD, 1985, table 20, p. 103). 
The slowing down in the pace of bank lend-
ing to developing countries before the debt crisis 
seems to lend support to the hypothesis that the 
previous growth had been a once-for-all pheno-
menon associated with a phase of diversification 
'Cline shows that the average loss rate on country lending 
could be estimated as 0.28% of loan values per annum, while the 
corresponding rate for domestic loans —as applied to the nine 
largest banks— was 0.72% (Cline, 1983, pp. 100-101). 
of bank portfolios. Even without the debt crisis, 
the international financial and trade system 
would have been under pressure to accommo-
date such a decline in a major mechanism of the 
international financial system. The slowing 
down was particularly serious as it happened in a 
context of sharply increased interest rates due to 
a shift in economic policy in the United States. 
Thus, average interest rates on medium and 
long-term floating rate debt for all developing 
countries went up from 12.3% in 1979 to 17.4% 
in 1981 (UNCTAD, 1985, p. 71). Excess interest 
payments, it has been estimated, offset more 
than half of the net additional financing for 
several countries and the whole interest bill 
exceeded new lending for more than one country 
(UNCTAD, 1985, p. 81). 
Impelled by the consequences of the post-
1979 crisis, some debt indicators tended to dete-
riorate further. Particularly, the ratios of debt to 
GNP and interest service to GNP for all develop-
ing countries jumped between 1978 and 1981 
from 21% to 22.4% and from 1.1% to 1.9%, 
respectively (World Bank, 1985, table 2.6, 
p. 24). 
Not only the increase in interest rates but 
also a worsening of the terms of new lending 
caused pressure to be brought to bear from the 
financial side on the balance of payments of 
debtor countries. Spreads rose in 1980 and 1981 
and average maturities lowered, with a signifi-
cant accumulation of short-term debt (World 
Bank, 1985, table 8.6, pp. 118-119). 
The above circumstances can be interpreted 
as additional evidence that banks were showing 
less interest, after 1979 and before the actual 
eruption of the debt crisis, in participating in the 
financing of developing countries' balance-of-
payments needs. This trend was greatly streng-
thened by the debt-servicing difficulties of some 
major debtors as from 1982. To better under-
stand the reaction of the commercial banks when 
confronted with those difficulties, it is important 
to keep in mind their own position. 
By the end of 1982 the exposure of the Uni-
ted States banks' capital in the form of loans 
granted to non-capital-surplus developing coun-
tries and Eastern Europe was extremely high. 
For all the American banks together, lending to 
those countries stood at 182.8% of their capital. 
For the nine largest money centre banks the 
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corresponding figure was 287% (Cline, 1983, 
pp. 32-33, and WFM, 1985a, p. 4). But other 
banks were also heavily exposed to potentially 
problem debtors. At the end of 1983, for 
instance, two of the largest British clearing 
banks —Lloyds and Midland— had a propor-
tionately greater exposure to Latin American 
debt (leaving Mexico aside) than any of the nine 
United States money centre banks (Financia/ 
Times, 1984). Banks in the Federal Republic of 
Germany were also heavily exposed in Eastern 
Europe, where they held more than 60% of the 
Polish debt. 
Capital-to-assets ratios had also been falling 
for banks in many of the industrialized countries 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s, presuma-
bly partly as a consequence of the fast pace of 
their international lending (World Bank, 1985, 
table 8.4). Moreover, in the changed interna-
tional economic environment, the previous 
advantages of floating rate lending now turned 
against the creditors. With the high and volatile 
interest rates, generated by the new monetary 
policy followed by the United States, debtors' 
difficulties meant high transfer and commercial 
risk. 
Although it is true that countries do not go 
bankrupt, historical experience confirms that 
both developing and developed countries may 
default on their international obligations. It is 
not at all surprising, therefore, that lending by 
banks to all developing countries grew by only 
6.6% in 1983 (almost corresponding to a target 
of 7% suggested during IMF negotiations with 
some of the largest debtors) and by even less 
— 2 % — in 1984. Figures for the first half of 
1985 were showing an even slower pace than 
that of the previous year (WFM, 1985a, p. 11 and 
BIS, 1985). 
Moreover, a large part of the new lending 
that had taken place is the result of what the 
World Bank calls "concerted lending" arranged 
in conjunction with debt restructuring under the 
guidance of the IMF. In fact, out of US$ 30.2 
billion and US$ 22.7 billion of syndicated Euro-
currency lending for the years 1983 and 1984, 
US$ 14.3 billion and US$ 11.3 billion could be 
attributed to "concerted lending" (World Bank, 
1985, table 8.6, pp. 118-119). 
As a result of this slow pace of growth for 
bank lending to developing countries, figures for 
capital exposure in such operations have fallen 
sharply for the nine largest United States banks, 
from the above-mentioned 287% in 1982 to 
214% by the end of March 1985, "... lower than 
at any time since 1977" (WFM, 1985a). Capital 
ratios in relation to assets have also been 
improving at a fast pace for United States banks, 
from 5% at the end of 1982 to 6.27% at the end 
of 1984 for the 15 largest institutions. Such an 
improvement in bank ratios has been obtained 
through a fast increase in bank capital at a rate of 
about 9-10% per year (Bergsten et d, 1985, 
p. 31).2 
In the performance and business strategies 
of banks it is difficult to separate the impact of 
regulatory activity from market-induced 
changes. I n the matter of capital/assets ratios no 
doubt —at least in the United States— regula-
tors have had a considerable influence. In fact, 
action on those ratios has been the main 
response to the threat to financial structures 
posed by the debt crisis in relation both to devel-
oping countries' debt and to domestic primary 
sectors, mainly agriculture and energy —the last 
one being responsible for the failure in 1984 of 
the Continental Illinois Bank, one of the ten 
largest in the country. 
Capital/assets ratio requirements were first 
of all raised in 1983 to 5 %. After the Continental 
Illinois Bank crisis they were further increased to 
5.5% and in April 1985 to 6%. Currently a new 
regulation is being discussed which might again 
raise required capital ratios and would also incor-
porate within the requirements some off-
balance-sheet operations like letters of credit 
outstanding. The proposal includes a new con-
cept, i.e., that of differentiated requirements for 
different kinds of assets. Third world debts 
would be placed, of course, at the top of the scale 
(Nach, 1986). 
Increased cap i ta i /asse t s requ i rements 
engender quite a contradiction for bank strate-
gies. As a consequence of the debt crisis, bank 
shares have lost value, so that they no longer 
represent a means to raise capital. Therefore, 
^Henry Terrell (1984), Chief, International Banking Div-
ision of the Federal Reserve System, estimates that United States 
banks' capital will increase, in the coming years, at about 9'/i per 
annum. 
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capital requirements have to be met through 
earnings at the very moment when some profit-
able activities are being discouraged as too risky. 
Banks have preferred not to employ their own 
capital and to emphasize so-called off-balance-
sheet operations, some of them carrying high 
risks. We shall see later how such a phenomenon 
becomes linked to what has been called the "sec-
uritization" of financial markets. The fact 
remains that in the eyes of regulators, and of 
more than a few bankers, capital ratios have to 
be re-established at higher levels, compatible 
with historical notions of prudential 
management. 
As a consequence of the debt crisis, regula-
tors have also tightened up rules on loan classifi-
cation and setting up of reserves. In the United 
States, loans for which no interest has been col-
lected in the previous 90 days have to be classi-
fied as "non-performing" and interest accrued 
on them deducted from the quarterly reported 
earnings. This rule was in fact tightened up in 
June 1984, at the time of conflict about the 
Argentine debt, in order to avoid what under the 
previous practice had been recurrent end-of-
quarter crises, since the rule used to be applied 
only at those points in time. 
Continuation of interest arrears for six or 
more months is one of the important factors that 
could cause a country to be classified as "sub-
standard" or "value impaired". In this case, 
banks have to set up reserves at a level specified 
as a percentage of the face value of the loans. 
Five countries were placed in this last category at 
the end of 1983, and a new one —Peru— has 
reportedly been added to the list in 1985. Provi-
sioning for bad loans has been restricted, there-
fore, to very few cases in the United States, 
although it is understood to be an extended prac-
tice in continental Europe, aided by very flexible 
and generous tax treatment of such reserves. 
On the other hand, it is important to note 
that neither regulations nor accounting practice 
require banks to write down the value of 
troubled loans in their balance sheets unless they 
change hands or the nature of the contract is 
altered. Consequently, loans to developing coun-
tries are carried at face value even if they are 
traded on a rather marginal secondary market 
with discounts of 15 to 75%.3 
More important, however, than regulatory 
pressure to discourage bank lending to develop-
ing countries is the influence of some develop-
ments in financial markets and structures, as 
well as the behaviour of the world economy. 
After a prolonged period in which commercial 
banks stressed growth —lending to developing 
countries being one attractive avenue for such 
strategy— increased awareness of risk has in 
more recent years encouraged more concern 
about profit levels and capital adequacy (OECD, 
1983 and 1985a). Risk, in turn, has its origins in 
a much more volatile economic environment: 
e.g., greater variability of interest and exchange 
rates and, of course, the problems of highly 
indebted countries. 
Consequently banks have been searching for 
new activities or placing new emphasis on old 
ones that would allow them to build up profits 
—the safest basis for generating capital 
increases in a context of lessened Stock 
Exchange confidence in the industry— without 
committing new capital. Off-balance-sheet oper-
ations implying contingent liabilities but no 
initial commitment of funds or sheer intermedi-
ation of third-party paper have generated sizable 
increases in fee-income and profits without 
making demands on their own capital and 
reserves. Ways have also been found to increase 
capital through other instruments than place-
ment of shares, such as the issue of floating-rate 
notes whose results are admissible as part of the 
banks' own capital. 
The whole process had led to what has been 
labelled the "securitization" of financial 
markets. Estimations published by the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) show that, while 
in 1981 out of a total of net international finance 
—both loans and bonds— of US$ 190 billion 
'See Montagnon ( 1986). It has been also estimated that the 
Stock Market, in 1983, implicitly valued —through bank share 
prices— loans to major debtors at 79ÇÏ of their face value. (See 
Bergsten et al (1985), p. 28.) Another regulation and/or account-
ing standard impinging on treatment of loans to developing coun-
tries is the requirement for public disclosure of so-called "Troubled 
debt restructurings", i.e., loan renegotiations involving conces-
sions not originally envisaged. It need not apply, however, to a 
weakening of lending terms as long as new-terms are still within 
market practice. 
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almost 87% was in the form of bank loans, this 
proportion fell to around 65% for the period 
1982-1984 and in the first half of 1985 it was 
down to only 42% (Bank for International Set-
tlements, 1985, table IV, p. 24). 
That shift in international financial markets 
is not only connected to banks' strategies but it 
also reflects basic changes in ultimate lenders 
and borrowers. The syndicated Euroloan reigned 
at the time when funds originated in OPEC coun-
tries —with a preference, at least initially, for 
bank deposits— and were lent to developing 
countries with little access to security markets. 
Now funds originate mainly in some industrial-
ized countries —Japan foremost among them— 
and have an important outlet in the financing 
—through bond purchases— of United States 
Federal Government deficits. 
The market has also witnessed the develop-
ment of 'hybrid' instruments like "note issuance 
facilities" or "transferable loans", which have 
blurred the distinctions between loans and bonds 
while giving commercial banks a chance to do 
business without long-run commitments of their 
resources. 
The rapid development of new instruments 
for financial intermediation is only very recently 
being incorporated into banking regulations. 
The pursuit of off-balance-sheet operations car-
rying important risks has led —in the case of the 
Bank of England— to requirements for up to 
50% capital coverage for note issuance facilities 
and the top of the ratio's scale for letters of credit 
in the above-mentioned new regulations under 
discussion by banking authorities in the United 
States. 
The consequence for developing countries, 
at any rate, is that —as the BIS has analysed— the 
international financial market has become a 
highly segmented one. For countries with debt 
problems, there is the "concerted" or "involun-
tary" lending market based on the need felt by 
big banks to look after their huge loan portfolios 
in those countries. This has represented about 
half of the syndicated Eurocurrency loan market 
in 1983-1984, which stood at about 50% of its 
peak pre-1982 level. For some other developing 
countries there is still a reduced access to syndi-
cated loans from international banks but lately 
recourse has been had to the floating rate note 
market and other forms of securities which 
entail lower costs. In fact, a great deal of activity 
in this sector is related to cancellation of earlier 
loans and refinancing through new instruments. 
As with lending in the late 1970s, bank activity 
in negotiable paper and off-balance-sheet opera-
tions is taking place at very reduced margins and 
with increased accumulation of risks (Bank for 
International Settlements, 1985, pp. 25-26). 
For debt-ridden developing countries the 
prospects could not be gloomier in this respect. 
Their low creditworthiness —as gauged by the 
financial markets— excludes them from sources 
of international private finance other than 
"involuntary" or optimistically —if adjustment 
were successful— "voluntary" bank lending. 
This will certainly grow, if at all, at an extremely 
slow pace in the coming years as a consequence 
of banks' having outgrown their capital base —a 
process which will take quite a long time to 
redress.4 According to the most optimistic pro-
jections of the results of the present "adjust-
ment" process of the highly indebted countries, 
the archetypal risk indicator —i.e., the debt/ex-
ports ratio— will for most countries take a long 
time to get down to a safe level of between 150% 
and 200%. In fact, for the ten major debtors the 
average ratio has actually increased from 257% 
to 308% between 1982 and 1985 (WFM, 1985a, 
table 6, p. 4). 
Simultaneously, banks would be caught in a 
process of building up their small capital base 
—the obverse side, one could say, of the high 
debt ratios of the developing countries— by 
avoiding committing their own resources to any 
lending, let alone to highly-indebted countries to 
which their exposure is still extremely high in 
terms precisely of their capital. The paradox is 
compounded by the fact that as bank debt is the 
largest part of the foreign debt of those same 
countries —almost two-thirds for the 15 Baker 
Plan countries— debtors are being forced to 
^Lessard and Williamson (1985, p. 17) estimate the future 
growth of bank lending to developing countries in the near future 
at 3% per year, the bulk being trade finance. Exposure to the ten 
major debtors increased at a rate of 2% per year from end-1982 to 
March 1985: a figure that may have improved lately after imple-
mentation of the fresh-money provision in the Argentine pro-
gramme beginning in July 1985 (see WFM, 1985a, p. 4 and also 
comments by a senior banker —Mr. Lawrence S. Brainard— of 
Bankers Trust Co. (1984)). 
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make up for the increased real interest burden 
(which ends up in commercial bank coffers) by 
having recourse to other international financial 
sources or by the generation of big trade sur-
pluses entailing a negative resource transfer to 
industrialized countries. 
The building up of debt to bank creditors, 
although an expedient instrument of develop-
ment finance and liquidity creation during the 
1970s, seems to have come to an end. A new 
system will have to be set up unless the balance-
of-payments position of developing countries is 
fundamentally transformed in the immediate 
future. Trends at work before the debt crisis, 
which were only reinforced by later develop-
ments, exclude commercial banks as a major 
force for the coming years in the financing of 
debtor countries. What are the prospects for 
other sources of finance? 
Let us first dispose of one source that has 
been mentioned with insistence, namely, foreign 
direct investment. The main objection to foreign 
direct investment is that, for the ten major deb-
tors, at its peak annual average of US$ 6 303 
million (in 1981/1982), it would still represent 
no more than 15% of those countries' annual 
interest payments. In fact, foreign direct invest-
ment has come down rather abruptly, rather as a 
natural consequence of the discouragement 
caused by the economic crisis brought about by 
the debt problems than because of any alleged 
irrational antipathies held by governments or 
public opinion in developing countries. For all 
its possible advantages in bringing in marketing 
or technical/managerial knowledge, foreign 
direct investment would not be a force of any 
significant weight in balance-of-payments 
terms. 
Somehow connected with foreign direct 
investment is the question of capital flight. Even 
in the period 1983-1984 capital outflows from 
highly-indebted countries —the ten major 
ones— represented more than half of the newly 
accumulated debt (WFM, 1985a, table 5). Such a 
flow is decisively influenced both by long-run 
trends and by more recent developments. From a 
long-run point of view, capital flight from deb-
tor countries is just one more instance of a 
world-wide phenomenon of portfolio diversifi-
cation by investors taking advantage of the inter-
nationalization of financial markets. In more 
recent times such a trend has been encouraged by 
the high rates of return that can be obtained in 
financial placements as a consequence of high 
real rates of interest plus institutional changes 
such as the elimination of withholding taxes. For 
debtor countries it is difficult to compete against 
such high rates of return —a problem that is 
compounded by the recessionary consequences 
of debt renegotiation plans. There seems to be 
little chance of any significant return of capital 
outflows, although sound macroeconomic poli-
cies on the part of debtor countries could, by 
offering better prospects for private investment, 
increase such a reflux within limits. Domestic 
tax treatment of this issue is of course highly 
contentious, particularly in countries where 
schemes for subsidization of private external 
debt —intimately connected through back-to-
back operations where deposits abroad operated 
as collateral for borrowing from foreign banks— 
were introduced during the debt crisis. 
We are therefore left only with official or 
officially-guaranteed sources of funds. Let us 
first take up the bilateral sources. Due to the 
increased role of bank lending in balance-of-
payments financing for the developing coun-
tries, official export credits were losing part of 
their share throughout the 1970s. As a percen-
tage of developing countries' total receipts, 
export credits went down from 15% at the 
beginning of the 1970s to 12% in 1981. Thereaf-
ter, they dropped further to only 8% in 1983 
(World Bank, 1985, table 7.2, pp. 96-97). To a 
great extent such a fall is only an expression of 
the fall in imports by developing countries and, 
more specifically, of capital-goods imports. 
There are, however, supply-side reasons to 
explain the reduction in export credits. 
Although interest rates charged on export cred-
its have been rising since the April 1978 agree-
ment among OECD countries, the sharp rise of 
market rates since late 1979 had increased the 
bill for interest subsidies from US S 2 billion in 
1978 to US$ 5.5 billion in 1981. Export credit 
agencies recovered US$ 1 billion in 1982 and 
US$ 2.5 billion in 1: i.e., less than outgoings at 
the very moment when fiscal austerity through-
out OECD countries was placing demands on the 
agencies to be self-sustaining (UNCTAD, 1985, 
pp. 114-115). 
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As a consequence of the above, export credit 
agencies have been criticized for displaying 
"herd-like behaviour" to a greater extent than 
have the commercial banks —i.e., their behav-
iour has been pro-cyclical. Terms of lending have 
been progressively tightened and, worst of all, 
cover has been suspended for countries entering 
debt renegotiations with the Paris Club. Only 
with great delay has such cover been reinstated 
after the successful negotiations. As a result, for 
the ten major debtors —out of which eight have 
gone to the Paris Club— net official export cred-
its from OECD countries went down from an 
annual average of US$ 3.7 billion in 1979-1981 
to US$ 2.74 billion in 1982-1984. For five out of 
the ten countries net flows were actually nega-
tive (WFM, 1985a, table 18, p. 11). 
There is a clear need for the role of official 
export credit agencies to be stepped up both in 
the long run and in the context of the debt crisis. 
In fact, some of the plans to sort out the debt 
problem revolve around radically increased 
funds from such agencies. Cover is also needed 
not only for capital goods but for current inputs, 
as was envisaged in Eximbank operations for 
Brazil in 1983. But their role is intimately linked 
with monetary and fiscal policy-making by the 
OECD countries, and in the present deflationary 
phase this has conspired against the enhance-
ment of their role. 
As for the multilateral institutions, the 
World Bank stepped up its disbursements to 
indebted countries, managing a total of almost 
US$ 5 billion in the period from end-1982 to 
June 1985 for the ten major ones. In terms of rate 
of increase, however, this amount is not very far 
above the interest rate prevailing in those same 
years. Criticism of the World Bank's procedures 
has been prominent in relation with the initia-
tive of the United States Secretary of the Treas-
ury 'Mr. James Baker) on the debt problem. 
Opposition by the United States Government to 
an increase in the resources of the World Bank 
remains, thus preventing greater mobilization 
of funds to the debtor countries in the medium 
term. In the meantime a greater stumbling block 
to the role of the World Bank is the additional 
conditionality and cross-conditionality with IMF 
that it is trying to impose on its quick-
disbursement lending. Debtor countries operat-
ing under IMF plans also encounter budget 
constraints in trying to fulfil the local counter-
part requirements of World Bank loans. But it is 
above all the attempt to promote an overall 
ideological viewpoint through loan conditional-
ity which, besides not fully respecting the Bank's 
statutes, is deterring debtor countries from using 
more fully their access to such resources. 
The role of IMF in the direct provision of 
resources cannot be denied in the context of the 
debt crisis. Nearly US$ 10 billion were lent by it 
from end-1982 to mid-1985 to the ten major 
debtor countries (WFM, 1985a, tables 8 and 9, 
p. 5). For the 15 debtor countries envisaged in 
the Baker initiative over the period 1982-1984, 
the Fund provided close to 20% of the external 
financing. 
Apart from disputes about conditionality, 
the real trouble about continuing this role, lies 
ahead. Access to IMF resources has been tight-
ened and no initiative seems to be in progress to 
replenish funds for the enlarged access policy 
that has superseded the Supplementary Financ-
ing Facility. In fact, in spite of the small potential 
for expansion of private credit to developing 
countries in the near future, it seems that the 
policy of the main industrialized countries is to 
keep the IMF as a lender of last resort and to 
encourage stabilization and adjustment rather 
than facilitating extra finance. Consequently, the 
IMF might very soon become a net recipient of 
funds. Repayments are climbing very fast as the 
post-1982 plans unwind, and countries looking 
for support from the Fund may find that draw-
ings will barely match repayments (WFM, 1985a, 
table 15, p. 9)-
If present policies are followed, therefore, 
there seems to be very little chance for official 
institutions to step in again to take up the role 
being abandoned by commercial banks in pro-
viding liquidity and development finance for 
developing countries. More serious even in the 
short run is the fact that the net drain of resour-
ces occasioned by the rather wide gap between 
interest payments to banks and "fresh money" 
provided by them is forcibly being filled by deb-
tor countries through accumulation of positive 
trade balances entailing a negative real transfer 
of resources, from the developing to the indus-
trialized countries. In the case of Latin America, 
for instance, the accumulated net negative 
transfer of real resources, in the period 1982-
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1984, has been above USjf 106 billion (leaving 
aside terms-of-trade effects), i.e., on average 
about 3-2% of the aggregate national income of 
the region (ECLAC, 1985). 
The burden of external debt service has 
brought to an end an era of easy financing 
through commercial bank credit, whose terms 
anyway were never wholly adequate for develop-
ing countries. A new financial system is needed 
to stop the negative transfer of resources from 
becoming chronic as a consequence of the great 
debt overhang. Estimates provided by, for 
instance, UNCTAD point however to the fact 
that, at present interest rate levels, it is very 
difficult to imagine any other source of borrow-
Since the beginning of the debt crisis an acri-
monious debate has raged over who —bankers 
or debtor governments— was responsible for 
the accumulation of debt levels considered to be 
too high. Some other commentators tend to 
blame the governments of industrialized coun-
tries for having actively encouraged the process 
as a way to recycle the oil surpluses through 
private markets. But is it true that debt levels are 
too high? The burden of debt service (given the 
"voluntary" or "involuntary" willingness of 
creditors to roll-over amortization) boils down 
to the burden of interest service. In turn, interest 
service depends not only on the size of the prin-
cipal but also on the rate of interest. 
Now, beginning in the last quarter of 1979, 
nominal interest rates shot up owing to the new 
monetary policy introduced by the UnitedStates 
Federal Reserve. Emphasis on monetary targets 
added to the stringency an element of great vola-
tility in nominal and real interest rates. After 
ing that would be sufficient to fill the gap; and 
even if it were available on concessional terms, 
the whole process could very soon end up with 
the accumulation of an even more serious debt 
problem (UNCTAD, 1985, pp. 107-110). 
No reform of the international system of 
liquidity creation and development finance, 
then, seems to be satisfactory. But, in fact, inter-
est rates are not natural events. Would it be 
conceivable for interest rates to be low enough to 
ease substantially the debt burden on developing 
countries? And what would be the connection 
between such a possibility and the reform of the 
international monetary system? To such ques-
tions the next section is devoted. 
that date a great deal of debt accumulation was 
due to the need to refinance excess interest pay-
ments. Consequently a Ponzi system of finance 
was started, under which the situation, partially 
at least, escaped control of debtors (and creditors 
also). New loans are granted simply in order to 
finance interest payments on the existing debt. 
Were debt levels up to 1979 excessive? Had 
debtors and creditors gone irretrievably beyond 
reasonable debt levels on the basis of historical 
experience? 
On the contrary. Historical experience on 
interest rates is quite clear. Taking United States 
prime rate as the nominal interest rate and the 
index of wholesale prices —now renamed pro-
ducer's prices— in that country as the indicator 
for inflation, the average real interest rate for 
the 60-year period 1920-1979 was only slightly 
above 1 % per year. If we do not go so far back in 
time, and take the 20-year period 1960-1979, the 
average real interest rate would have been 1.3%-
II 
Economic policy co-ordination among countries, the 
reform of the international monetary system 
and the fundamental solution to the 
external debt problem 
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Of course for the 1970s the average real interest 
rate was slightly negative. But this is not the 
point, because a prudent debtor country govern-
ment or banker would not have relied on it 
staying there. 
After 1978, nominal rates of interest kept 
pace with inflation for about two years, in 1979 
and 1980. But with inflation subsiding by 1981, 
nominal rates (although they declined after 
1981, and especially after the mid-1982 debt 
crisis) have been kept at a level that generates 
real rates of interest for the four-year period 
1981-1984 of around 10% per year. In 1985, 
there was some reduction in nominal rates, 
down from the peak 13% of the third quarter of 
1984 to 9.5% in the second half of 1985. But real 
rates have still been in the range of 6 to 7% per 
year. 
Nothing in the pre-1979 experience could 
have told a decision-taker at the end of the 1970s 
that real interest rates could reach and stay at so 
high a level. The only other instances of real 
rates above 10% per year were the first three 
years of the 1930s depression and the year 1921, 
also a crisis year after the post-First World War 
inflation.5 Moreover, dispersion around those 
long-run averages was quite low, with a post-war 
peak at 4.6% in 1967. 
The point, then, is not that decision-makers 
projected to the future negative real rates of 
interest (granted a rather exotic circumstance 
only persistently seen in the 1940s). The point is 
that, on the basis of historical experience, inter-
est service on external debt could have been quite 
easily achieved, even without refinancing, 
through fresh loans, with very little adjustment 
effort. 
Even in 1985, with all the newly accumulated 
debt and the impact on export proceeds of the 
lowest export prices seen in the post-war period, 
current account balances for the 15 problem 
indebted countries envisaged in the Baker initia-
tive would have been in sizable surplus at histor-
ical levels of the real rate of interest. In fact, with 
inflation as measured by the wholesale price 
s
 For series of prime rate and of the wholesale (later produc-
ers') price index going back to 1920,seeUnitedStates Department 
of Commerce (1975). For more recent data, see the same source, 
1984. 
index of the United States only slightly above 
2% plus (to be generous) a 1.5% real rate of 
interest, plus, say, a spread of 1 point, nominal 
rates of interest would stand below 5% for a 
developing country borrower, whereas instead 
they are actually above 10% at present. 
At a nominal interest rate of 5% on an 
accumulated debt, for those 15 countries at the 
end of 1984, of US$ 427 billion, interest service 
would thus have stood at no more than USJt 21 
billion. But in 1985 the combined trade balances 
of those 15 countries was above US$ 39 billion, 
with increases in reserves and other minor items 
detracting only some US$ 5 billion from the 
trade balance. A surplus of about US$ 14 billion 
would thus remain, allowing for extra imports or 
even a cushion of more than 3 points against 
increases in real rates of interest.6 
Of course, no surplus on the trade balance of 
those countries was available in 1982. But had 
not the interest rates reached those extraordi-
nary and persistent levels beginning in 1981, a 
much weaker adjustment on the part of debtors 
would have allowed a current account equili-
brium and hence, with the ensuing better credit-
worthiness, a continuation —although at lower 
levels— of private market finance. 
Argument about responsibility for the 
accumulation of debt is therefore misplaced. 
Both bankers and the debtor countries' govern-
ments have been taken by surprise by the abso-
lutely unforeseeable and extraordinary level of 
real rates of interest. Bankers, by increasing 
spreads, have only to a minor degree com-
pounded a phenomenon which was not of their 
own making and which in fact resulted in a 
situation in which a large proportion of their 
portfolios, both international and domestic, 
looked rather shaky. 
We have already seen that, at present levels 
of interest rates, it is inconceivable that other 
sources could replace commercial banks in gen-
erating a sufficient stream of finance to achieve 
current account balance. We have now seen that 
it is the extraordinary level of real interest rates 
that generated the debt crisis and is responsible, 
to some extent, for the retreat of commercial 
6For figures on debt and external financing of the 1 5 Baker 
Plan countries, see Institute of International Finance, 1985. 
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banks from the financing of developing coun-
tries. The debt crisis, in fine, originates in the 
high level of interest rates. In fact, it is just one 
expression of a disinflation process, as it was at 
the beginning of the 1930s or in 1921. 
The impact on the debtor countries of the 
deflationary forces put into action in industrial-
ized countries goes beyond their effect on inter-
est rates. Export volumes as well as export prices 
have also been seriously affected, and this in turn 
has worsened the balance-of-payments situation 
of debtor countries. The UNCTAD secretariat has 
estimated that the cumulative loss of export pro-
ceeds over the period 1980-1983 due to commod-
ity price declines reached US$ 28 billion for a 
group of 48 developing countries. In 1984, non-
oil commodity prices picked up with the recov-
ery of the word economy, but by the third quarter 
decline had again set in and continued through-
out 1985, getting even worse in 1986. The World 
Bank index for prices of basic products stood in 
1985 at its lowest level (81, compared with an 
average of 100 in the three-year period 1979-
1981) since the series was started in the late 
1940s (UNCTAD, 1985, p. 78). 
As overvaluation of the United States dollar 
has also been a consequence of the deflationary 
policies followed after 1979, there is little point 
in discussing which factor —the OECD level of 
economic activity or the high dollar— has been 
responsible for the low prices of basic products. 
Of course, there are more long-run forces at 
work having to do with technical substitution of 
some materials, like copper, which can hardly be 
subject to policy action. But certainly declines in 
prices of cereals, beef or sugar are, to a large 
extent, a direct consequence of subsidy schemes 
in industrialized countries. 
The combination of excessive real interest 
rates and low commodity prices engendered by 
the economic policies of the industrialized coun-
tries, therefore, has induced a reverse real 
transfer of resources —i.e., from developing to 
developed countries— of gigantic proportions. 
In Latin America, for instance, the loss of income 
on account of the fall in the terms of trade and 
the excessive real rates of interest could be in the 
region of US$ 30 billion per year, which is more 
than 3 % of the region's gross domestic product.7 
The need, however, to cut imports so as to make 
room for such a transfer of resources has led to a 
cut in the developing countries' purchases 
abroad which the UNCTAD secretariat estimates 
has entailed the loss of close to 7 million man-
years of employment in Europe and close to 1 
million man-years in the United States and Can-
ada during 1982-1984 (UNCTAD, 1985, p. 119 
and table 26, p. 120. 
Thus, the deflationary policies applied in the 
industrialized countries have induced a crisis in 
the developing countries which, in turn, reacts 
back as a further deflationary force on levels of 
output and employment in the industrialized 
countries, notwithstanding any benefit that 
might have accrued to them in terms of transfer 
of resources from developing countries. 
A growing consensus of opinion among pro-
fessional economists blames the specific eco-
nomic policy mix applied by the United States in 
this period for the high interest rates, and also 
lays blame on the high dollar, with its effects on 
commodity prices. Tight money has been fol-
lowed by fiscal expansion. Starting with the tax 
reductions and the enhanced rearmament pro-
gramme of the Reagan Administration, the Uni-
ted States Government has increased its fiscal 
deficit to the level of almost 5% of GDP. Since 
there is a rather low domestic savings ratio, the 
deficit is spilling over the rest of the world as the 
Administration seeks funds to fill the gap. From 
1982 to 1984, the United States capital account 
experienced a positive swing of around US$ 90 
billion. Within the OECD area Japan accounted 
for the major part of this increase of net capital 
flows into the United States. The gap of about 
US$ 30 billion which was left was covered by 
countries outside the OECD area, "notably by a 
reduction in net capital flows to non-oil develop-
ing countries as they reduced their current defic-
its by some US$ 40 billion".8 In fact, the United 
'See ECLAC (1985) for figures on the 16.5% fall in the terms 
of trade since 1980 (table 9), which, applied to aggregate exports 
—at 1985 prices— of USJ 91.93 billion (table 12), would mean a 
loss of some USÏ 15 billion. On the other hand, 4-5 points of excess 
interest rates as applied to a global debt of US$ 360 billion 
(table 15) means another loss of USS 15 billion; the sum of both 
items relative to aggregate tiDP for the region (US$ 890 billion) 
gives 3.3%. 
8See OECD ( 1985b) and the analysis of the reorientation of 
capital flows given there. 
62 CEPAL REVIEW No. 30 / December 1986 
States Government has taken the place of the 
developing countries in this new phase of inter-
national financial "recycling", with japan and 
some other countries, like the Federal Republic 
of Germany, now playing the former role of the 
OPEC countries at the time of the original 1970s 
"recycling". The wealthiest country is thus 
absorbing resources from the rest of the world by 
financing abroad a large proportion of a fiscal 
deficit which is the consequence of an expanded 
rearmament programme and tax cuts. 
The problem with the United States policy 
mix to fight inflation through a revaluation of 
the dollar is that it is essentially asymmetrical. 
Not all countries can manage to revalue their 
own currencies, although in a world of non-fixed 
exchange rates an attempt could be made to do so 
through a process of competitive revaluations 
(instead of the classic beggar-my-neighbour pol-
icy of competitive devaluations that Bretton 
Woods was supposed to avoid). Under the influ-
ence of the alleged advantages of the floating 
exchange rate system in granting complete auto-
nomy to the economic policy of each nation, the 
traditional attempts to co-ordinate international 
economic policy were abandoned in favour of the 
presumed work of an "invisible hand" as applied 
to the community of nations, just as Adam Smith 
envisaged if for national economies. Thus, in the 
last few years we have witnessed extreme diver-
gence in economic policy stances, leading to 
extreme values in some of the market-
determined variables such as exchange or inter-
est rates. 
This whole attitude has been, in some 
instances, elevated to the level of dogma. Thus 
we see Mr. Henry R. Naun—a former official of 
the United States National Security Council in 
charge of international economic affairs— lend-
ing support for "... an assertive use of U.S. eco-
nomic power in the marketplace... and a 
relatively passive U.S. economic diplomacy", a 
"combination that could work because the U.S. 
power in the international marketplace... 
remains much greater than its power at the 
bargaining table" (Bergsten, 1985 and Naun, 
1984-1985). However, the wide disequilibria 
that the world economy is experiencing —of 
which the debt problem is one more aspect— 
and some further academic work on optimum 
policies in an international economy tend to 
indicate that it is high time for "unilateralism" to 
be replaced by a co-ordinated approach. Protec-
tionist pressures in the United States, unleashed 
by the high dollar, seem to have convinced the 
United States Administration of the need to 
start modifying its previous point of view and to 
accept the idea both of intervening in exchange 
markets and of doing so in a co-ordinated way, at 
least in the context of the Western summit coun-
tries (Group of Five).9 
The debt problem will only find a perman-
ent, fundamental solution in a context of world 
economic growth with reasonable levels of com-
modity prices and real interest rates. Disputes 
about the exact magnitude of the elasticities of 
developing countries' exports to OECD growth 
rates cannot alter the fact that this growth is 
needed if exports from debtor countries are to 
expand so as to be able both to serve the accumu-
lated external debt and to finance a higher and 
growing level of imports.10 
Even more important, there is no doubt that 
a reduction of real rates of interest to historical 
levels would basically dispose of the debt prob-
lem. But for rates of interest to fall, co-ordinated 
action among the United States, Europe and 
Japan is needed so that the United States fiscal 
deficit may continue to be financed. Thus the 
debt problem is intimately connected with a path 
towards reform of the international monetary 
system that would increase mechanisms of sur-
veillance for avoiding "unilateralist" policies and 
introduce, perhaps through a new exchange rate 
system, forces making for such co-ordination. 
The fundamental, long-run solution to the debt 
crisis would also call for ¡nsr**" : '>"° l reform of 
the international monetary system in order to 
generate enough liquidity and development 
finance to replace the role played by commercial 
banks in the 1970s. 
'For work on how an unco-ordinared set of economic policies 
is likely not to be efficient, see Oudiz and Sachs (1984). See also 
Marris (1985). 
l0See Cline (1983), chapter 3. Dornbusch and Fisher (1984) 
also give alternative estimates of the same elasticities. For the 
notion that growth of the world economy is absolutely indispensa-
ble for the solution of the debt problem, see the speech by James 
Baker, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, at the Annual Meeting of the 
IMF/IBRD ¡n Seoul, in October 1985- See also WFM (1985b). 
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III 
The adjustment process in highly-indebted countries, 
conditionality and the debt problem in the 
transition to a growing world economy 
It will certainly take time to bring back growth 
with price stability and reduced real interest 
rates as well as more reasonable levels of com-
modity prices. Let us hope that it will not involve 
a "crash landing" for the value of the debtor, in 
view of the negative consequences this could 
have for all countries. In the meantime, there is 
an urgent need to alleviate the debt burden, 
which has not only brought stagnation and crisis 
to the developing countries but has proved to be 
an additional deflationary force in the world 
economy and is posing a serious threat to the 
stability of the international financial system. 
The measures to be taken should address the 
fundamental causes of the problem. It is not 
realistic to imply that the debt problem was 
brought about by a simultaneous failure of pru-
dent economic management on the part of ail 
the countries in trouble, in view of the differen-
ces in their economic policies and their political 
regimes. After three years of adjustment and of a 
drastic swing in trade and current account balan-
ces, what remains of the debt problem is surely 
only external to the debtor countries. The debt 
problem, as it now stands, must be seen for what 
it is, i.e., an external shock generated by the 
economic policies followed in the industrialized 
countries which shifted the values of key eco-
nomic variables to abnormal levels which there 
is no reason to believe will not be rectified. It is 
thus a reversible external shock which, to avoid 
introducing gratuitous deflation of the world 
economy, should be treated by the provision of 
finance to avoid cutbacks in demand. Moreover, 
a reversible external shock should not induce 
adjustment in allocation of resources that could 
afterwards be difficult to undo. That is to say, if 
present levels of interest rates imply the need for 
high trade surpluses, there would be little point 
in inducing accelerated export sector promotion 
and/or import substitution investment that will 
not be required once those rates return to a 
normal range, in terms of market signals, 
present-day prices (levels of exchange and inter-
est rates) are not proper guidance for long-run 
investment decisions, as they are far removed 
from any conceivable long-run equilibrium. 
Up to now, however, the administration of 
the debt problem has taken a completely differ-
ent course to the above. Debtor countries have 
been forced to cut domestic expenditure levels, 
causing a drastic fall in imports. And the only 
promise these countries have been offered is that 
there will be a solution to their predicament in 
export-led growth, with the corresponding real-
location of resources. Now it is one thing to 
justify misconceived action on the grounds that 
credit rationing to developing countries makes it 
non-viable to choose any other way than the one 
the debtor countries are being asked to follows, 
but it is quite another to wrongly ascribe the debt 
problem mainly to domestic over-expenditure 
and misallocation of resources which in turn, 
would imply that the burden should be thrown 
on the shoulders of the indebted countries. The 
debt problem calls for external finance accom-
panied by the little adjustment needed to put an 
end to over-expenditure —to the extent that it 
existed— and to induce the trend adjustments 
and the structural reforms that were needed any-
way before the crisis struck in 1982. 
The international monetary system must 
find ways to accommodate such a transition to a 
more normal growth path. The Group of 24 and 
the Cartagena Consensus have repeatedly put 
forward reasoned proposals for action (mainly 
by the International Monetary Fund) to cope 
with the immediate aspects of the debt problem. 
Once the debt crisis is regarded as an external, 
reversible shock on the balance of payments, the 
possible solutions become clear enough. 
The International Monetary Fund has long 
accepted the difference between temporary and 
fundamental disequilibria. For the first kind, 
facilities like the Compensatory Financing Facil-
ity were devised. On very low-conditionality 
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terms, it provides funds to make up for an exo-
genous decline in export values or, in recent 
years, an increase in cereal import prices. During 
the mid-1970s also, the Oil Facility came into 
operation, lending —even to some developed 
countries— on low-conditionality terms to avoid 
deflationary cuts in spending as a consequence of 
balance-of-payments deficits generated by the 
oil price increases. As a few authors have argued, 
there is no reason why the Compensatory 
Financing Facility could not be extended to cover 
other exogenous shocks on the balance of pay-
ments of a borrowing country. In particular, Wil-
liam Cline (1981) and Sidney Dell (Dell and 
Lawrence, 1980) have argued for a compensa-
tory financing facility that could absorb the 
impact of increases in interest rates. The Group 
of 24 (1979) has also discussed the possibility of 
setting up a medium-term facility with repay-
ment periods adequate for the necessary structu-
ral reallocation of resources. 
Of course, the question arises of the sources 
of financing for such facilities. There is no ques-
tion that, except for the United States, the fiscal 
policies of the industrialized countries are still 
extremely restrictive. New funds will be difficult 
to come by. However, countries in surplus —as 
some oil exporters were a decade ago— could 
make special contributions and themselves fund 
some of these facilities. Sometimes too much is 
made of the effort necessary to increase quotas in 
IMF. After all, of any increase in quotas only 25 % 
has to be made effective, and on the other 75% 
interest is earned. The financial cost of a quota 
increase is therefore much less than the appar-
ent one. In fact, it boils down to the cost of 
differential interest between the market rates 
and those applying to 75% of the contribution, 
which is 0.85 of the SDR rate plus the 25% in 
Special Drawing Rights or designated foreign 
exchange. IMF quotas, anyway, have fallen radi-
cally in relation to world trade or, worse still, 
even in relation to current account imbalances. 
There are other sources already available 
that could be applied to alleviate the burden of 
high interest rates in the transition to an 
improved world economic environment. The 
first one is the 19 billion SDRs in the kitty of the 
General Agreement to Borrow. At least part of 
this sum is intended to avoid prospective crises 
in the international financial system, which cer-
tainly would be the case if there are any major 
interruptions of debt service. Last but no least, 
there is always the possibility of a major issue of 
SDRs. Explicit objections to such issues have 
been based in the last few years on the fear of 
feeding inflation. With significant unused capac-
ity in all industrialized countries, with full 
employment adjusted surpluses in fiscal 
accounts for most countries, with high unem-
ployment rates and a slackening in earnings 
growth and labour costs, it seems that the time 
has come to shed concern for inflation and to 
embrace unhesitatingly the cause of world eco-
nomic reactivation.11 
Mobilization of other official institutions 
would be complementary to the setting up of 
adequate facilities under the International 
Monetary Fund. 
There is no question that the World Bank's 
resources and procedures must be improved so 
that a larger volume of development finance is 
made available, now that the commercial banks 
have retreated from the role they played in the 
1970s. But it would be wrong to make the World 
Bank —for lack of adequate resources and proce-
dures under the International Monetary Fund— 
a balance-of-payments support institution. Such 
an attempt, which is partially incorporated in 
the Baker initiative, is doomed to failure as the 
speed at least, if not the direction, of the structu-
ral reforms that the World Bank should encour-
age bear little relation to the external debt shock 
of the developing countries. 
"See WFM (1985b) for figures on adjusted fiscal balances 
and, more in general, for the argument that expansion is now 
decisively needed to avoid stronger protectionism and a renewed 
debt crisis. 
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IV 
Concluding comments 
The above analysis points to a consensus-
seeking, tow-tier strategy to tackle the external 
debt problem at the world level. 
i) Fundamental reform of the international 
monetary system has to be introduced and an 
immediate process of co-ordination of economic 
policies is required to achieve non-inflationary 
growth with reduced real interest rates and reas-
onable levels of commodity prices. 
ii) Action is urgently needed to provide 
finance on adequate terms to see the developing 
countries through the transition period towards 
the achievement of that growth. Such finance 
would have to come mainly from official institu-
tions, and the multilateral financial institutions 
are —after the necessary reforms— the best 
candidates to replace commercial bank lending. 
In particular, conditionality should be low, as 
befits the external, reversible shock character of 
the balance-of-payments disequilibrium during 
this period. In this way, no extra deflationary 
forces would be introduced in the world economy 
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